Part 7 of 8 · Regulatory Oversight, Professional Conduct & Jurisdiction

Because the IBC is a complete code with its own sufficient checks, balances, and statutory remedial mechanisms (NCLT and NCLAT); a natural justice grievance about a CoC meeting should have been pursued through that framework, not through a separate writ petition under Article 226.

The delay of nearly three years between the resolution plan's approval and the challenge being brought before the High Court.

It set aside the Karnataka High Court's judgment, restored the CoC-approved resolution plan, and directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume and expeditiously conclude the CIRP from the stage at which it had been interdicted.

The Supreme Court cited it to reinforce that High Courts should not substitute constitutional review for the statutory mechanism under the Code — there, specifically to prevent a High Court from pre-empting the Adjudicating Authority's role in admitting or rejecting a personal guarantor application under Sections 95–100.

No — it held the NCLT lacked jurisdiction under Section 60(5) to decide this genuinely independent, pre-existing private civil law title dispute, since it was not directly related to the insolvency resolution process.

No — the Supreme Court held a resolution plan cannot confer ownership in such circumstances; the underlying title dispute must be resolved through the appropriate civil forum, not folded into the insolvency process.

The NCLT had treated it as such without a properly filed avoidance application under Sections 43/45 and without adequate notice and pleadings — procedural correctness is required before any such finding can be made.

Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam shows the jurisdiction reaches disputes (like contract termination) genuinely intertwined with the CIRP's success; this case shows it does not reach disputes that are, in substance, independent private civil law questions merely touching an asset connected to the corporate debtor — the key distinguishing factor is the closeness of the nexus to the insolvency process itself, not merely whether the corporate debtor is involved.

No — the NCLAT held that once the delay was already condoned by an earlier NCLT order, it could not be revisited later as a fresh irregularity; procedural deviations without substantive prejudice do not nullify a valid resolution process.

It would effectively restart the CIRP, eroding the corporate debtor's value and defeating the Code's core objective of timely resolution.

It set aside the NCLT's order cancelling the CoC's approval, restored the CoC-approved resolution plan, and directed the NCLT to revive the RP's pending application for formal approval under Section 31.

This case shows a minor, already-remedied procedural deviation should not derail a valid, value-maximising process; Hindalco shows the opposite end of the spectrum — a genuinely fraudulent, collusively engineered CIRP that fully warranted quashing the resulting plan and imposing penalties. Together they illustrate the range of what does and doesn't count as serious irregularity.

No — it only requires that members be whole-time members of IBBI; the numerical composition is separately addressed by Regulation 2(1)(c) of the IBBI (Inspection and Investigation) Regulations, 2017.

Yes — the Bombay High Court held it is permissible to constitute a Disciplinary Committee with either a single whole-time member or more than one.

No — it held the regulation does not travel beyond what Section 220(1) itself provides; it validly fills in an administrative detail the statute left unspecified.

That a subordinate regulation can validly supply administrative or procedural detail left unaddressed by the parent statute, provided it does not exceed or contradict the statute's own express requirements.

No — the Disciplinary Committee (and the Delhi High Court on review) found the real motive was to circumvent fee regulations and increase his own effective compensation, regardless of the technical related-party classification.

Suspension of his registration as an Insolvency Professional for a period of two years.

To ensure maximum value is released from selling the company's assets, so that creditors — including financial institutions, public sector banks, and employees — are paid as fully as possible.

Because such dissipation directly depletes the value otherwise available for creditors, defeating the entire purpose of the liquidation process.

No — the Jharkhand High Court held an RP is not listed among the categories of persons qualifying as public servants under that provision.

No — since that provision specifically targets public servants, and an RP does not qualify as one, it cannot be applied to an RP's conduct in that role.

It protects them from liability for acts done in good faith while discharging their duties or functions under the Code.

The two cases operate on different tracks — an RP's misconduct can still lead to disciplinary consequences through IBBI's own regulatory machinery (as happened to Sundaresh Bhat), even though the RP is not exposed to criminal "public servant" liability under statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act.

No — the Court held it is sufficient if there is a broad correlation between the regulator's services and the fee charged; an itemised, service-specific correlation is not required.

A fee of 0.25% of the IP's remuneration received in the preceding financial year, charged in addition to an existing five-yearly registration fee.

No — it held the provision validly empowered IBBI to frame such fee-related regulations without exceeding its delegated authority.

The BSE Brokers' Forum case, which established that a broad correlation between services and fees is sufficient for a valid regulatory fee.

An authorisation an Insolvency Professional must obtain from their Insolvency Professional Agency before accepting a new assignment, required under Regulation 7A of the IP Regulations, 2016.

No — it upheld the validity of Regulations 7A and 13, treating the AFA requirement as a legitimate, ongoing check on an IP's fitness for each specific assignment.

Because an IP's circumstances, conduct, and fitness can change over time; an ongoing authorisation check for each new assignment allows the regulatory framework to catch issues (like pending disciplinary proceedings or non-compliance) that may have arisen after initial registration.

Both cases were brought by the same petitioner against IBBI's regulatory framework and decided by the same bench in the same period — together they confirm the validity of two separate planks of IBBI's regulatory apparatus (fees and ongoing assignment authorisation).

No — the Delhi High Court held this jurisdiction is not conferred upon the NCLT; as a creature of the IBC itself, it cannot assume the power to declare the Code's own provisions or regulations illegal or ultra vires.

A superior court exercising writ or constitutional jurisdiction, such as a High Court — not the NCLT.

It reasoned that the two-step Expression of Interest process under Regulation 36A added delay inconsistent with the IBC's core emphasis on speed in the resolution process.

It acknowledged speed as a salient feature of the IBC but held that Regulation 36A's structured process does not necessarily impede that objective — rather, it is a valid mechanism for orderly, transparent solicitation of resolution plans, and in any event, the NCLT lacked jurisdiction to make a vires determination regardless of its reasoning.

No — the Madras High Court held that exploring a Section 230 compromise during liquidation is itself contemplated within the IBC's scheme, and performing it under NCLT's direction does not place the IP's conduct beyond IBBI's regulatory reach.

No — the Court held IBBI and IPAs can exercise parallel, independent oversight; an IPA's earlier rejection does not preclude IBBI from separately initiating its own proceedings.

Sharing the corporate debtor's valuation report with prospective scheme proponents while acting as Liquidator.

Because the petitioner himself admitted having shared the valuation report — the factual basis for the notice was not seriously disputed, only its legal propriety, which the Court resolved in IBBI's favour.